Paphlagonian Slingers

Description

Fast, cheap, and capable of flinging rocks with surprising malice. These highland Paphlagonian slingers are deadly in broken terrain, but are not able to hold the line against a phalanx. They are lightly equipped skirmishers who wear little to no armour, perhaps a woven helmet, a tunic with short sleeves, and a pair of their native shoes that reach midway to the knee.

Historical background

Paphlagonia, a hilly region situated between Bithynia and Pontus, was home to hillmen well-versed in the art of ambush. Throughout its history, Paphlagonia came under the control of various empires, including Lydia, Persia, and eventually that of Alexander the Great in 333 BC. After Alexander's death, the region enjoyed a measure of independence before being gradually absorbed by the expanding Pontic kingdom in the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC. Following the defeat of Mithradates VI by Pompey in 65 BC, parts of Paphlagonia were incorporated into the Roman provinces of Bithynia and Galatia (Manoledakis, Paphlagonians and Phrygians (2022), p. 221).

The Paphlagonians were well-known for their military capabilities, particularly as light infantry. While specific historical records about Paphlagonian slingers are scarce, it is plausible that, like other Anatolian regions, they employed slingers in their armies. These were recruited from among the free peasantry and mountain clans, long accustomed to border raids and tribal warfare. Though their equipment is basic, their skill with the sling should not be underestimated. As Connolly notes, the sling was “a cheap but highly effective weapon” that could kill or incapacitate with a single well-placed shot (Connolly, Greece and Rome at War (1998), p. 90). Indeed, these slingers are not armoured, well-drilled, or even particularly clean, but they can hit a helmet slit at fifty paces with a rock the size of their enemies ego!

Xenophon himself noted the deadliness of such missile troops during his expedition through the area in the Anabasis (4.1.15), when his Greek mercenaries were assailed by indigenous slingers and archers who seemed to vanish into the terrain as quickly as they appeared. Their lack of protection was offset by their speed, making them ideal for hit-and-run tactics and harassing heavier units. They are skirmishers, not heroes after all.

But do not be fooled by their lack of armour. Archaeologists like Erciyas have unearthed Hellenistic-period sling bullets in central Anatolia, some inscribed with Greek letters, slogans, names, or curses (Şimşek, and Erciyas, Inscribed Lead Sling Bullets from Hellenistic Period in Central Anatolia, 2021). It seems that even these modest hillmen knew the value of psychological warfare: nothing quite ruins an adventurous soldier’s career like a lead pebble engraved with “This one’s for your knee”. These bullets indicate a continuity of slinging traditions in the region and show that Paphlagonian troops likely adapted Hellenistic military innovations when available.

Although Paphlagonian slingers are not frontline soldiers, these men play a crucial role in softening the enemy, following their movements, and exploiting any rough terrain to their advantage. A disciplined phalanx might be unshaken by arrows, but a stone from a lead bullet striking the temple can be just as fatal. Strategically, these men are best used to screen an army’s flanks, disrupt enemy formations, and run away before anyone can catch them. They can bait cavalry into traps, chip away at hoplite lines, or simply exhaust their foes into making a mistake. What they cannot do is hold a line, or follow orders for very long. But for a few coins and a goat, they will join your army and happily wing projectiles at your enemies all day long.

Of course, do not expect them to do this out of loyalty. The Paphlagonians are notorious for switching sides if the pay runs dry or if someone insults their moustaches. Herodotus, when describing the Paphlagonian contingent in Xerxes’ army (7.72), made special mention of their peculiar regional dress and their caps, details that seem charming until one realises that behind each shaggy hat was a man who would happily blind a Persian for a handful of figs.

Historically, in 334 BC, after the victory at the Granicus, Alexander appointed Kalas satrap of the Hellespontine Phrygia, the first satrapy that fell into his hands, and ordered the inhabitants of the region to pay to him the same tribute that they gave also to Darius (Arrian 1. 17). Next, he moved southwards to the Greek cities of the Aegean coast, before turning north to Gordion in 333 BC. After having cut the Gordian knot, he reached Ankara. There, he had his only, as it seems, meeting with envoys of a local southern Black Sea nation, the Paphlagonians (Plutarch Alexander 18. 5; Arrian 2. 4; Curtius Rufus 3. 1. 22-24), who offered him their land, asking him not to invade it, and also not to pay tribute to him. Alexander accepted their requests and just commanded them to obey Kalas.

Here we may have one of the smartest diplomatic moves in Paphlagonian history: it seems that the Paphlagonians, seeing the impetuous advance of Alexander towards Asia and realising that he was aiming to move towards the heart of Persia and not towards the southern Black Sea littoral, went to meet him themselves before his passing from their land, and achieved an enviable result. They persuaded Alexander not to invade Paphlagonia, and also to not even demand tax tribute from them, by telling a king-conqueror exactly what he would like to hear: a people declaring allegiance to him. But this declaration practically meant nothing. As was the case with Alexander’s command to them to obey Kalas. For as soon as Alexander would move away from the region, the Paphlagonians could not only continue their normal life and activities, but also make it a scene of Persian efforts to recover areas of the empire that had been conquered by the Macedonians. And so it happened, almost at once: less than a year from this meeting, vigorous young soldiers from Paphlagonia (and Cappadocia) helped some generals of Darius who had survived the battle of Issus to recover Lydia (Curtius 4. 1. 34), while Kalas was forced to invade Paphlagonia (Curtius 4. 5. 13), which was supposed to obey him (Manoledakis, "Politics and Diplomacy in Paphlagonia", in: Tsetskhladze and Atasoy (eds), Settlements and Necropoleis of the Black Sea and its Hinterland in Antiquity, 2017).

It was only in 322 BC that Perdiccas defeated the Persian Ariarathes, who was satrap and later king of Cappadocia (350-322 BC), conquered Paphlagonia and gave it to Eumenes (Diodorus 18. 16. 1, 18. 22. 1; Plutarch Eumenes 3. 2; Arrian Events after Alex. 10; Justin 13. 6). In the Treaty of Triparadeisos in 321 BC, Paphlagonia is again not mentioned as a separate satrapy, but judging from Diodorus’ (18. 39. 6) and Arrian’s (Photius Bibliotheca 92. 71b) formulations, it seems more likely that it belonged to the satrapy of Cappadocia, among those that ‘faced the north’. In that case, Paphlagonia was ruled by Nikanor (cf. Appian Mithridates 8). After the death of this not clearly identified person, maybe in 311 BC (Appian Syr. 55; contra Diodorus 19. 92. 5; 19. 100. 3), Paphlagonia seems to have been under the control of Antigonus and, after the Battle of Ipsus (301 BC), of Lysimachus, until 281 BC, when both of them died and the Pontic kingdom was born under Mithridates I, who used the Paphlagonian fortress Kimiata as the base of his operations.

During the period of the Pontic kingdom, we read in Memnon’s history (11. 2) that when the Gauls crossed over to Asia, in ca. 277 BC, Nicomedes of Bithynia made a pact with them, according to which ‘they should always support Nicomedes and should be allies of the Byzantines, if necessary, and of the inhabitants of Tieion and Heraclea and Chalcedon and Cierus, and of some other nations’ rulers’. As outlined by Manoledakis, the Paphlagonians remained politically semi-autonomous well into the Hellenistic period, often negotiating their freedom between the Seleucids, Pontic rulers, and invading Galatians by offering military support and regional knowledge (Manoledakis, 2017). While their leaders occasionally posed as kings or dynasts, most Paphlagonian communities retained a fiercely independent and martial identity.

Stats

Weapons

Defence

Condition and terrain

In battle: Very good stamina

Who can recruit it

A core roster unit for one faction, which can raise it anywhere it holds the right building:

Paphlagonia

Any faction holding one of the provinces below can field it.

Areas of recruitment